WORMSCAN: WORMSCAN.& [PART 1]
Involvement of Politicians, Judges, Lawyers, & Police in the Drug Business
NOTES: I made a few corrections to spellings but left the original document mainly untouched. Some dates are in YYMMDD format. These files are only a portion of the entire WORMSCAN.& file. I had to break it up due to length. There are hundreds of pages. Notice the change in format. There are much more details added to this.
WORMSCAN.&
By David P Beiter
[REPRINTED WITH PERMISSION]
WORMSCAN.& is composed of long stories received from various Internet sources.
Blocks are filed by date, and marked by three snails at the head.
One paragraph summaries are in WORMSCAN.
Many more incidents are reported in WORMSCAN.
[REDACTED]
@@@
881200, US Senate, (GOV DOC # Y 4.F 76/2:S.prt.100-165). In
Date: Thu Feb 22, 1996 8:52 am CST
From: snet l
EMS: INTERNET / MCI ID: 376-5414
MBX: snet-l@world.std.com
TO: * David Beiter / MCI ID: 635-1762
Subject: SNETL: (fwd) Federal facilitation of narcotics smuggling: the evidence (fwd)
-> NOTICE - this list is MOVING before 3/1/96
-> Send "subscribe iufo" to listserv@xbn.shore.net
LONG. From alt.conspiracy.
Evidence about the drug-smuggling criminals running this country.
Psst ! We peasants are coming with our pitchforks. Fill up those moats fast.
----Forwarded message-----
Do you want solid evidence that persons at the highest levels of our government have facilitated the importation of tons of cocaine into this country? Read on. What follows are excerpts from a government document called, DRUGS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND FOREIGN POLICY. This document, which some had hoped would be lost and buried, was produced in December 1988 by the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. It is for sale by the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs., Washington, April 13, 1989. (GOV DOC # Y 4.F 76/2:S.prt.100-165)
Excerpts are from pp. 36, 41, 42-47, 53-58, 59, 60. The guts of it I`ve boiled down to 5 pages. Key parts are typed in caps, for those who might only want to skim. Parenthetical remarks are mine.
NARCOTICS TRAFFICKERS AND THE CONTRAS
The head of the Costa Rican =91air force,=92 and personal pilot to two Costa Rican presidents, Werner Lotz, had a very simple explanation for the involvement of drug traffickers with the Contras in the early days of the establishment of the Southern Front in Nicaragua: =93The Contras were desperate for resources. Without drug money their efforts would certainly have failed.=94=20
The logic of having drug money pay for the pressing needs of the Contras appealed to a number of people who became involved in the covert war (against the possibility of successful socialism in Nicaragua). Indeed, senior U.S. policy makers were not immune to the idea that drug money was a perfect solution to the Contras=92 funding problems. (If the Congress would not allow the Contras and the struggle against communism to be funded legally, then other means would have to be found. =91Communism=92 had to be stopped---no matter what the price. The ends justified any means necessary.)
The initial Senate Committee investigation into the international drug trade, which began in April, 1986, was precipitated by allegations that Senator John F. Kerry had received, regarding illegal gun-running and narcotics trafficking associated with the Contra war against Nicaragua. This investigation attempted to discover the interaction between foreign policy, narcotics trafficking, and law enforcement.
The investigation came to two conclusions: first that the supply network of the Contras was used by drug traffickers, and secondly that the Contras knowingly received financial and material assistance from drug traffickers. In both cases, one or another agency of the U.S. government had information regarding the involvement, either while it was occurring or immediately thereafter.
- More specifically, this committee investigated:
1) The participation of narcotics traffickers in Contra supply operations through business relationships with Contra organizations,
2) Provision of assistance to the Contras by narcotics traffickers, including cash, weapons, planes, pilots, air supply services and other materials, on a voluntary basis by the traffickers,
3) PAYMENTS TO DRUG TRAFFICKERS BY THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, using funds authorized by Congress for humanitarian assistance to the Contras, IN SOME CASES AFTER THE TRAFFICKERS HAD BEEN INDICTED BY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES ON DRUG CHARGES, in others while traffickers were under active investigation by these same agencies.
_____________________________________________________
On several thousand acres of land in northern Costa Rica, which were owned by a number of Americans (one of whom was receiving $10,000 a month in coke proceeds, by way of orders from Oliver North in the Reagan White House.), there was constructed a rather elaborate infrastructure, ostensibly for assisting the Contra Southern Front, in Nicaragua, just to the north. Mainly it consisted of runways (6 of them), hangars, housing, storage buildings, and airplane refueling facilities. This infrastructure became increasingly important to the drug traffickers, as this was the very period in which the cocaine trade to the U.S. from Latin America was growing exponentially.
In the words of Karol Prado, an officer of the ARDE Contra organization of Eden Pastora on the Southern Front, `drug traffickers approached political groups like ARDE trying to make deals that would somehow camouflage or cover up their activities.`
As DEA OFFICIALS TESTIFIED last July (1987) before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Lt. Col. Oliver North suggested to the DEA in June 1985 that $1.5 million in drug money---carried aboard a plane piloted by DEA informant Barry Seal and generated in a sting of the Medellin Cartel and Sandinista officials---be given to the Contras. While the suggestion was rejected by the DEA, the very fact that it was made, highlights the utility and appeal of drug profits, among those engaged in covert activity.
Costa Rican pilot Werner Lotz emphasized that Contra operations on the Southern Front were in fact funded by drug operations. He testified that weapons for the Contras came from Panama on small planes. The pilots unloaded the weapons, refueled, and headed north towards the U.S. with drugs. These pilots included Americans, Panamanians, and Colombians, and occasionally uniformed members of the Panamanian Defense Forces. Drug pilots soon began to use Contra airstrips to refuel, even when there were no weapons to unload. They knew that the authorities would not check the airstrips because the war was `protected.`...
U.S. GOVERNMENT FUNDS GOING TO COMPANIES WITH=20 DRUG CONNECTIONS
To supply `humanitarian assistance` to the Contras, the (Reagan-Bush) State Department selected four companies known to be owned and operated by narcotic traffickers. The companies were:
- SETCO Air, a company established by Honduran drug trafficker Ramon Matta Ballesteros;
- DIACSA, a Miami-based air company operated as the headquarters of a drug trafficker enterprise for convicted drug traffickers =20 Floyd Carlton and Alfredo Caballero;
- FRIGORIFICOS DE PUNTERENNAS, a firm owned and operated=20 by Cuban-American drug traffickers;
- VORTEX, and air service and supply company partly owned by admitted drug trafficker Michael Palmer.
In each case, PRIOR TO THE TIME THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT ENTERED INTO CONTRACTS WITH THE COMPANY, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS HAD RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT THE INDIVIDUALS CONTROLLING THESE COMPANIES WERE INVOLVED IN NARCOTICS.
Officials at NHAO (Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Organization) told GAO investigators that all the supply contractors were to have been screened by U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies _prior_ to receiving funds from State Department on behalf of the Contras, to insure that they were not involved with criminal activity. But neither the GAO nor the NHAO were certain whether this had actually been done.
Consider the State Department`s first choice, SETCO. U.S. law enforcement records clearly show that SETCO was established by Honduran cocaine trafficker Juan Matta Ballesteros. A 1983 Customs Investigative Report states that `SETCO (Services Ejectutivos Turistas Commander) is headed by Juan Ramon Mata Ballestros, a class-I DEA violator.` The same report states that, according to the Drug Enforcement Agency, `SETCO aviation is a corporation formed by American businessmen who are dealing with Matta and are smuggling narcotics into the United States.`
One of the pilots SELECTED to fly Contra supply missions for SETCO was Frank Moss, a man who has been under investigation as an alleged drug trafficker since 1979. Moss has been investigated, though never indicted, for narcotics offenses by ten (10) different law enforcement agencies.=20
This Subcommittee received documentation that one Moss plane, a DC-4, N90201, was used to move Contra goods from the United States to Honduras. On the basis of information alleging that the plane was being used for drug smuggling, on the return trips, the Customs Service obtained a court order to place a concealed transponder on the plane.
A second DC-4 controlled by Moss was chased off the west coast of Florida by a Customs Service pursuit plane. Mid-air, the Moss DC-4 began dumping into the ocean, below, what appeared to be a large load of drugs. When the plane landed at Port Charlotte no drugs were found on board, but the plane`s registration was not in order and its last known owners were drug traffickers. Law enforcement personnel also found an address book aboard the plane, containing the telephone numbers of some Contra officials and the Virginia telephone number of Robert Owen, Oliver North`s courier and principal associate. Careful inspection of the plane revealed the presence of significant marijuana residue. The DEA seized the aircraft on March 16, 1987.
FRIGORIFICOS DE PUNTERENNAS
Frigorificos de Punterennas is a Costa Rican seafood company which was created as a cover for the laundering of drug money. This according to the grand jury testimony by one of its partners, as well as the testimony by Ramon Milian Rodriguez, the convicted money launderer who established the company.
From=20its inception, it was operated and owned by Luis Rodriguez of Miami, Florida, and Carlos Soto and Ubaldo Fernandez---two convicted drug traffickers. It`s main purpose and function was to launder drug money. According to Massachusetts law enforcement officials, owner Luis Rodriguez directed the largest marijuana smuggling ring in the history of the state, and was indicted on drug trafficking charges by the federal government on September 30, 1987 and on tax evasion in connection with the laundering of money through Ocean Hunter on April 5, 1988.
**Luis Rodriguez** was also the person who controlled the bank account held in the name of Frigorificos, WHICH RECEIVED $261,937 IN `humanitarian assistance funds` FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN **1986**. Rodriguez signed most of the orders to transfer the funds (for the Contras) out of that account. Rodriguez was also president of Ocean Hunter, an American seafood company created for him by Ramon Milian Rodriguez. Ocean Hunter imported seafood it bought from Frigorificos and used inter-company transactions to launder drug money.
Milian Rodriguez TOLD FEDERAL AUTHORITIES ABOUT **LUIS RODRIGUEZ`**NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING PRIOR TO MILIAN RODRIGUEZ` ARREST IN MAY **1983**. In March and April 1984, IRS AGENTS **INTERVIEWED** LUIS RODRIGUEZ REGARDING OCEAN HUNTER, DRUG TRAFFICKING AND MONEY
LAUNDERING, and he took the Fifth Amendment in response to every question. In September, 1984, Miami police officials advised the FBI of information that Ocean Hunter was funding Contra activities through `narcotics transactions,` and noted that Luis Rodriguez was its president. This information confirmed previous accounts the FBI had received concerning the involvement of Ocean Hunter (and its officers) in Contra supply operations which involved the Cuban American community.
DESPITE THE INFORMATION POSSESSED BY THE FBI, CUSTOMS AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, FULLY DOCUMENTING Luis Rodriguez` INVOLVEMENT IN NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND MONEY LAUNDERING, the Reagan-Bush State Department used Frigorificos, which Rodriguez owned and operated, to deliver `humanitarian assistance` to the Contras in late 1985. Official funds for the Contras (and the drug traffickers), from American taxpayers, began to be deposited into the Frigorificos account in early 1986, and continued until mid-1986.=20
In May 1986, Senator Kerry advised the Justice Department, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the State Department, the NHAO and the CIA of allegations he received that Luis Rodriguez (and his companies) were involved in drug trafficking and money laundering. In August 1986, the Foreign Relations Committee asked the Justice Department whether the allegations about Luis Rodriguez were true, and requested documents to determine whether the State Department might have in fact provided funds to a company controlled by drug traffickers. However, the (Reagan-Bush) JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REFUSED TO ANSWER THIS INQUIRY.
The indictment of Luis Rodriguez on drug charges 18 months later demonstrated that the concerns raised by Senator Kerry to the Justice Department and other agencies in May 1986 (concerning Rodriguez` companies), were well founded. =20
The inescapable conclusion: THE U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT HAD, IN FACT, KNOWINGLY CHOSEN COMPANIES OPERATED BY DRUG TRAFFICKERS TO SUPPLY THE CONTRAS.
THE CURIOUS CASE OF JOHN HULL, PATRIOT
John Hull was a central figure in Contra operations on the Southern Front of Nicaragua when these operations were being managed by Oliver North, from 1984 through late 1986. Before that, according to former Costa Rican CIA station chief Thomas Castillo`s public testimony, Hull had helped the CIA with military supply and other operations on behalf of the Contras. In addition, during the same period, at Oliver North`s direction, Hull received $10,000 a month from Contra leader Adolfo Calero, (ultimately paid for by America`s growing number of coke and crack addicts).=20
Hull was an Indiana `farmer` who moved to northern Costa Rica in the mid-1970`s and persuaded a number of North Americans to invest in ranch land in the northern part of that country. Using their money and adding some of his own, he purchased thousands of acres of Costa Rican farm land just south of the Nicaraguan border. Properties under his ownership, management or control ultimately included at least six airstrips. To the many pilots and revolutionaries who passed through the region, this collection of properties and airstrips became known as John Hull`s ranch.
On March 23, 1984, seven men aboard a U.S. government-owned DC-3 were killed when the cargo plane crashed near Hull`s ranch, revealing publicly that Hull was allowing his property to be used for airdrops of supplies to the Contras. But even before this public revelation of Hull`s role in supporting the Contras, officials in a variety of Latin American countries were aware of Hull`s activities as a liaison between the Contras and the United States government. For example, Jose Blandon testified that former Costa Rican Vice President Daniel Oduber suggested that he (Blandon) meet with Hull as early as 1983, to discuss the formation of a unified southern Contra command under Eden Pastora.
Five witnesses have testified that Hull was involved in cocaine trafficking: Floyd Carlton, Werner Lotz, Jose Blandon, George Morales, and Gary Betzner. Betzner testified that he personally witnessed, in Hull`s presence, cocaine being loaded onto planes headed for the United States.
Hull became the subject of an investigation by the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of Florida in the spring of 1985. In late March 1985, Assistant U.S. Attorney Jeffrey Feldman and two FBI agents went to Costa Rica to investigate neutrality Act violations by participants in the Contra re-supply network that were also under investigation at the time by Senator Kerry. Both the Feldman and Kerry inquiries had been prompted in part by statements made to reporters by soldiers of fortune imprisoned in Costa Rica, who alleged that John Hull was providing support for the Contras with the help of the (Reagan-Bush) National Security Council.
Feldman and the FBI agents met with U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica, Lewis Tambs, and the CIA Chief of Station, Thomas Castillo, who told him (Feldman) that John Hull knew Rob Owen and Oliver North. Castillo gave the impression that Hull had been working for U.S. interests prior to March of 1984. In addition, one of the embassy security officers, Jim Nagel, told one of the FBI agents accompanying Feldman that, regarding Feldman`s inquiries, `...these are agencies with other operational requirements and (you) shouldn`t interfere with the work of these agencies.` When Feldman attempted to interview Hull, he learned that Hull had been told by the embassy staff not to talk to him unless he (Hull) was accompanied by an attorney. Not surprisingly, Feldman concluded that U.S. Embassy officials in Costa Rica were taking active measures to protect Hull. (It would not be the first time that a U.S. Embassy was managed and staffed by the CIA).
@@@
881200, Washington, DC.
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 1996 07:44:33 -0800
From: mregen@ix.netcom.com (Marnie Regen )
To: DRCTalk@drcnet.org
Subject: Narcotics and the North Notebooks
Message-ID: <199601101544.HAA19095@IX5.IX.NETCOM.COM>
Caught this on usenet, thought some might be interested:
-----------------------------------------------------------
DRUGS, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND FOREIGN POLICY: A REPORT
-----------------------------------------------------------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. December 1988.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Washington : U.S. G.P.O. : For sale the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs., April 13, 1989.
-----------------------------------------------------------
GOV DOC # Y 4.F 76/2:S.prt.100-165.
-----------------------------------------------------------
From pp. 145-147.
APPENDIX: NARCOTICS AND THE NORTH NOTEBOOKS
SUMMARY
Among the voluminous testimony and documents received by the Iran/Contra Committee was a significant amount of material relevant to matters under investigation by the Subcommittee on Narcotics, Terrorism, and International Operations.
In early 1987, the Subcommittee Chairman, Senator John F. Kerry and Senator Daniel K. Inouye, the chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, worked out an agreement under which staff assigned to the Subcommittee would receive the necessary special security clearances to study all of the documents to which the Iran/Contra committees had access.
In November and December 1987, the cleared Committee staff read thousands of pages of Iran/Contra Committee material including the "North notebooks," which consisted of 2,848 pages of spiral-bound notes taken by North on a daily basis from September, 1984 through November, 1986 covering his activities, telephone calls and meetings while he was at the National Security Council. In reviewing these notebooks, the Committee staff found a number of references to narcotics, terrorism and related matters which appeared relevant and material to the Subcommittee's inquiry. However, in many of these cases, material in the Notebooks adjacent to the narcotics references has been deleted from the material provided to the Committee.
Upon reviewing the matter with staff of the Iran/Contra Committees, the Subcommittee learned that neither the Iran/Contra Committees nor the White House had had access to uncensored North Notebooks. Instead, North or his attorney had deleted portions of the Notebooks which they considered to be outside of he jurisdiction of the of the Iran-Contra Committees. In all, 1,269 of the pages of the Notebooks were censored to some extent by North or his attorneys prior to being delivered to the Iran/Contra Committees, with 155 pages blacked out completely.
This occurred because North took the Notebooks from the White House in November 1986 before his documents were impounded, and turned them over to his lawyer, Brendon Sullivan. The Notebooks were then subpoenaed by the Iran/Contra Committees. North asserted his Fifth Amendment Constitutional right, and was then given limited immunity by the Committees to compel his testimony. After North was given immunity, his attorneys still objected to furnishing the full Notebooks, contending that they were not relevant to the Committee's investigation and North need only furnish portions which he and his attorneys determined were relevant.
Because of the Iran/Contra Committee's very tight deadlines and the need to have the Notebooks for at least a brief period prior to beginning the questioning of North, the Committee agreed to allow North's lawyers to make deletions from the Notebooks. North or his attorneys blacked out hundreds of Notebook pages and numerous entries. Some of the censored entries were read by Committee lawyers, but most were not. Most important, the lawyers who read the diaries at that time did not know names, dates and places which would later prove to be important, and therefore were not in a position to determine the relevance of the material deleted.
The Iran/Contra Committee's staff had only a few days to review the material before North was questioned. The thousands of pages were furnished in often illegible copies and would have taken weeks of analysis to make sense of under the best of conditions.
Under a fundamental agreement over classification which the Iran/Contra Committees made with White House, the Notebooks were classified at codeword level and could only be released after a review by a White House declassification team.
Following the review of the diary entries by cleared staff, Senator Kerry read several hundred pages of the North Notebooks and wrote the White House on January 25, 1988 requesting the immediate declassification of 543 pages containing references to drugs and drug trafficking, North's probe of the investigation into North's activities initiated by the Foreign Relations Committee in 1986, and related matters.
A White House declassification team declassified some of the requested materials. Some of the materials were deemed "not relevant to the investigation," and others were not declassified because the White House team could not determine what they meant without reading portions not in their possession since they had been previously censored by North and his attorneys. The White House did not declassify 104 of the pages requested by the Committee staff, contending that all further declassifications would have to await the processing of materials necessary for Independent Counsel Walsh in connection with the prosecution of Admiral John Poindexter, Albert Hakim and Richard Secord for alleged criminal activity in connection with their roles in the Iran/Contra affair.
When the Committee staff discussed the problem posed by the high classifications given the materials within the North notebooks, White House Counsel A.B. Culvahouse said the White House considered the Notebooks the property of the federal government and subject to classification at the highest levels.
The Subcommittee chairman, Senator Kerry, wrote the White House to state that if the Notebooks were as sensitive as the White use contended, they should not be allowed to remain in the possession of either North, whose clearances had been terminated and who remained under indictment, or in the hands of his attorneys, who cannot be cleared to the codeword level. While reiterating that it considered the materials to be highly classified, the White House took no steps to secure the materials it contended remained federal property.
COMMITTEE ACTION
On April 26, 1988, the Committee voted 17-1 to approve a subpoena for the full North Notebooks. The subpoena was served on Lt. Colonel North. On May 10, 1988, North's attorney, Brendon V. Sullivan, Jr., appeared before a Committee hearing called for the purpose of receiving the subpoenaed materials. Sullivan provided no materials and asserted North's Fifth Amendment privilege. He further asked the Committee to rescind the subpoena on the grounds that its issuance would jeopardize North's right to a fair trial, and that the material requested was beyond the jurisdiction of the Foreign Relations Committee. After receiving legal advice from the Office of the Senate Legal Counsel, the Committee voted 10-8 to enforce the subpoena on September 14, 1988, but was unable to secure the materials prior to the end of the 100th Congress.
CASE STUDY: THE DRUG-RELATED ENTRIES
Because of the extensive deletions in the Notebooks made first by North and his attorneys and secondly by the White House, it is difficult to gauge from the non-classified materials of the Notebooks the full extent to which the Notebooks relate to terrorism or narcotics trafficking, the areas of the Subcommittee's direct jurisdiction. However, even in their highly incomplete state, the Notebooks do contain numerous references to drugs, terrorism, and to the attempts of the Committee itself to investigate what North was doing in connection with his secret support of the Contras.
Among the entries in the North Notebooks which discernably concern narcotics or terrorism are:
May 12, 1984. ... contract indicates that Gustavo is involved w/drugs (Q0266)
June 26, 1984. DEA - (followed by two blocks of text deleted by North) (Q0349)
June 27, 1984. Drug Case
- DEA program on controlling cocaine
- Ether cutoff - Colombians readjusting
- possible negotiations to move refining effort to Nicaragua
- Pablo Escobar
- Colombian drug czar
- Informant (Pilot) is indicted criminal
- Carlos Ledher
- Freddy Vaughn (Q0354)
July 9, 1984. Call from Clarridge
- Call Michael re Narco Issue
- RIG at 1000 Tommorrow (Q0384)
- DEA Miami - Pilot went talked to Vaughn
- wanted A/C to go to Bolivia to p/u paste
- want A/C to p/u 1500 kilos
- Bud to meet w/Group (Q385)
July 12, 1984. Gen Gorman
- *Include Drug Case (Q0400) Call from Johnstone
- (White House deletion) leak on Drug (0402)July 17, 1984. Call to Frank M
- Bud Mullins Re leak on DEA piece
- Carlton Turner (Q0418) Call from Johnstone
- McManus, LA Times
- says/NSC source claims W.H. has pictures of Borge loading cocaine in Nic. (Q0416)
July 20, 1984. Call from Clarridge
- Alfredo Cesar Re Drugs
- Borge/Owen leave Hull alone (Deletions)/Los Brasiles Air Field
- Owen off Hull (Q0426)
July 27, 1984. Clarridge:
- (Block of White House deleted text follows)
- Arturo Cruz, Jr.
- Get Alfredo Cesar on Drugs (Q0450)
July 31, 1984.
- Finance: Libya
- Cuba/Bloc Countries
- Drugs ... Pablo Escobar/Frederic Vaughn (Q0460)
July 31, 1984. Staff queries re (White House deletion) role in DEA operations in Nicaragua (Q0461)
Dec. 21, 1984. Call from Clarridge: Ferch (White House deletion)
- Tambs-Costa Rica
- Felix Rodriguez close to (White House deletion)
- not assoc. W/Villoldo
- Bay of Pigs
- No drugs (Q0922)
Jan. 14, 1985. Rob Owen
- John Hull
- no drug connection
- Believes (Q0977)
July 12, 1985. $14 million to finance came from drugs (Q1039)
Aug. 10, 1985. Mtg. w/A.C.
- name of DEA person in New Orleans re Bust on Mario/DC-6 (Q1140)
Feb. 27, 1986. Mtg. w/Lew Tamb
- DEA Auction A/C seized as drug runners.
- $250-260K fee (Q2027)
Numerous other entries contain references to individuals or events which Subcommittee staff has determined to have relevance to narcotics, terrorism, or international operations, but whose ambiguities cannot be resolved without the production of the deleted materials by North and his attorneys.
Accordingly, the Subcommittee continues to believe that the production of the deleted material could shed important light on a number of important issues in connection with foreign policy, law enforcement and narcotics and terrorism. The Chairman of the Subcommittee will urge that further steps be taken to secure the original North notebooks in an uncensored form.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 1996 20:14:59 -0800
From: mregen@ix.netcom.com (Marnie Regen )
To: DRCTalk@drcnet.org
Subject: Oliver North and the CIA/DEA "sting" (2/3) (long)
Message-ID: <199601230414.UAA20346@IX.IX.NETCOM.COM>
---- Begin Forwarded Message
Newsgroups: misc.activism.progressive
Subject: MENA: Oliver North, Barry Seal, and the CIA/DEA "sting" (2/3)
Date: 22 Jan 1996 23:54:23 GMT
-----------------------------------------------------------
ENFORCEMENT OF NARCOTICS, FIREARMS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING LAWS:
-----------------------------------------------------------
Oversight Hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, Second Session, July 28, September 23, 29, and October 5, 1988.
-----------------------------------------------------------
Washington : U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs., Congressional Sales Office, 1989.
---------------------------------------------------------
GOV DOC # Y 4.J 89/1:100/138
-----------------------------------------------------------
The following testimony is from pp. 56-67, 72, 74-78.
The persons asking the questions are:
Congressman William J. Hughes, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee.
Congressman Bill McCollum
Excerpts from Oversight Hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee
ENFORCEMENT OF NARCOTICS, FIREARMS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING LAWS
Thursday, July 28, 1988
TESTIMONY OF RON CAFFREY, CHIEF OF THE COCAINE DESK IN 1984, DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY [DEA], U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; FRANK MONASTERO, FORMER ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, DEA; AND DAVE WESTRATE, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, DEA
Mr. CAFFREY: I have been a field agent, supervisor, middle management, special agent in charge. I have held various positions at the headquarters level in our Office of Inspection, Chief of our Domestic Enforcement, and Chief of our Cocaine Section.
Mr. HUGHES: Are you still Chief of our Cocaine Section?
Mr. CAFFREY: Special Agent in Charge in Atlanta, Georgia?
Mr. HUGHES: As Chief of the Cocaine Desk, DEA Headquarters, when did you first become aware of the Seal Nicaragua case?
Mr. CAFFREY: In the Spring of 1984.
Mr. HUGHES. Did you have any personal involvement or are you aware of the CIA being asked to assist the DEA?
Mr. CAFFREY: I am aware the CIA was involved with us, but specifically to track down when that occurred. I couldn't do.
Mr. HUGHES: How did you first become aware of the case?
Mr. CAFFREY: In the early spring or late winter, the National Narcotics Border Interdiction in Washington, D.C. referred Barry Seal to one of my staff coordinators in Washington. Seal was interested in cooperating with the government. One of my staff coordinators, Frank White, interviewed him, determined in fact there was a case on him in Florida, and he was referred back to the Miami Division to cooperate with our office in Miami.
Mr. HUGHES: At what point did the Seal Case become a case of major interest to your section?
Mr. CAFFREY: When he commenced making airplane visits to Latin America, Colombia and so forth, to bring drugs into the country.
Mr. HUGHES: Did DEA have information that supported Seal's reports that the Ochoa organization may be moving from Colombia to Nicaragua and other places?
Mr. CAFFREY: Independent of Seal, no. At that time my recollection is that, the Colombian organization had suffered a number of setbacks in the spring of '84 and they were diversifying their operations to various places in Central America. But my recollection is that Nicaragua really surfaced through Seal.
Mr. HUGHES: Can you explain for us what the impact of the tranquil and difficult raid was in March of 1984?
Mr. CAFFREY: Approximately ten tons of cocaine were seized in the Coquita Province, which is later labeled Tranquil Landia by the Colombian National Police. The DEA furnished leads to the police that resulted in those raids. While the availability of cocaine, the change in the availability of cocaine was incremental as a result of that, I think it did stir up some consternation among the trafficking groups. That is surmise on my part or analysis, but they were concerned. They felt out in the middle of the jungle they were safe and here one of their major complexes was raided and seized.
Mr. HUGHES: But there is no question that that raid gave them great deal of concern. Many of the top leaders in the Medellin cartel left Colombia during that period of time?
Mr. CAFFREY: There were a series of events. That was one major event. There was an assassination made on the Minister of Justice, I believe subsequent to that, which placed a lot of law enforcement response by the Colombian Government against the traffickers. So there were a number of reasons why they were seeking other areas to operate out of.
Mr. HUGHES: The assassination of the Justice Minister in particular put a great deal of pressure on the organization?
Mr. CAFFREY: Yes.
Mr. HUGHES: Did DEA have any involvement in acquiring the C-123K air transport used by Seal, which was described earlier byMr. Jacobsen?
Mr. CAFFREY: I am not aware we were. I think we may have assisted in paying for some retrofitting on it, but in terms of the acquisition of the aircraft, I am not familiar with that.
Mr. HUGHES: But you did assist in retrofitting it at the Air Force Base?
Mr. CAFFREY: We assisted financially with it. That was our function in Washington. We didn't really - we were not operational line control people. We were coordinators who supported investigations by gaining authorities or by providing funding.
Mr. HUGHES: Who actually made the arrangements at DEA to have that work done?
Mr. CAFFREY: I am not sure.
Mr. HUGHES: You didn't?
Mr. CAFFREY: I did not.
Mr. HUGHES: You did not participate in that?
Mr. MONASTERO: I did, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HUGHES: Okay. Did you provide any briefings to the White House, National Security Council, the CIA, the Department of Justice, State Department or others, other agencies prior to the time Seal left Homestead Air Force Base to pick up the cocaine in Nicaragua?
Mr. CAFFREY: I don't recall that I did. I recall that I gave a briefing after his return with the drugs and prior to his return with the money. I gave that briefing - I don't know the specific date, but I gave it to Oliver North of the National Security Council. A CIA person by the name of Dewey - his first name is Dewey - and one other person.
Mr. HUGHES: We will get into that. But at that point you had not conducted any briefings for anybody at the National Security Council or State Department?
Mr. CAFFREY: I had not, no.
Mr. HUGHES: You had not. How were you advised of the results of Seal's successful trip to pick up the cocaine?
Mr. CAFFREY: By the Miami Division. By the case agents in Miami who were running the operation.
Mr. HUGHES: Was that by teletype?
Mr. CAFFREY: Probably by phone and by teletype.
Mr. HUGHES: Did you receive the photographs that ere returned on the plane the same day Seal returned from Nicaragua? That would be about the 26th of June of 1984.
Mr. CAFFREY: I don't recall the exact date when we got the photos, but it was shortly after their return - the return from Nicaragua with the drugs - that the photos were sent to me from Miami.
Mr. HUGHES: Had you received the photos from Miami before you were asked to brief the National Security Council?
Mr. CAFFREY: Yes.
Mr. HUGHES: Who asked you to brief the NSC?
Mr. CAFFREY: I believe it was Mr. Westrate or Mr. Monastero or both.
Mr. HUGHES: What was the reason given for the briefing? Do you know off hand?
Mr. CAFFREY: I don't know that they gave me a reason. I presume I knew what the reason was at the time, to ensure that our investigation was coordinated, since it was an investigation taking place in a sensitive area where we did not have an office as we normally operate.
Mr. HUGHES: But after the C-123C returned from Nicaragua with a load of cocaine, it was at that point, during that time frame, that you were then requested to brief the NSC?
Mr. CAFFREY: Yes sir.
Mr. HUGHES: Shortly thereafter, within a few days?
Mr. CAFFREY: It occurred before the return trip on July the 7th. I just can't pin down the exact date.
Mr. HUGHES: Did you know before you went to the briefing who was going to be present?
Mr. CAFFREY: No sir.
Mr. HUGHES: Did you know what government agencies would be represented?
Mr. CAFFREY: I knew representatives from the National Security Agency would be there.
Mr. HUGHES: This was not a formal meeting of the NSC?
Mr. CAFFREY: No sir.
Mr. HUGHES: Just members from the NSC or staff?
Mr. CAFFREY: Yes sir.
Mr. HUGHES: Were you given any instructions prior to the briefing by your superiors?
Mr. CAFFREY: No sir.
Mr. HUGHES: Were you told to withhold any information or restrict details of any particular matters?
Mr. CAFFREY: No sir, just to show them the photographs and keep them up - brief them up as to where we were at that particular point in time in the investigation.
Mr. HUGHES: Tell us what took place at the initial briefing, where it took place, and what took place, and who was present.
Mr. CAFFREY: It took place in the Executive Office Building. As I say, it occurred somewhere between the 26th - the return with the drugs - and July 7th and the departure. I went over to the building and Oliver North was there with a person from the CIA by the name of Dewey and another individual whose name escapes me. I don't recall who that was. And I displayed the photographs that we had and pointed out some of the defendants who were the picture. It was my sense of it, that they were familiar with the investigation.
Mr. HUGHES: So you sensed they already had the photographs and knew who was in the photographs?
Mr. CAFFREY: Yes. It was simply really we rehashed what our intentions would be in the investigation in the future and I did most of the talking in terms of the briefing, and during the course of it, they were asking me questions.
Mr. HUGHES: What did you say to them during that briefing? Now present apparently were Colonel North - Oliver North - with the National Security Council, a man by the name of Dewey, who was with the Central Intelligence Agency, yourself?
Mr. CAFFREY: There was also another person from the DEA with me, but I am not exactly sure who it was. It may have been one of the staff assistants for the front office.
Mr. HUGHES: It was just those three agencies who participated in the briefing - DEA, CIA -
Mr. CAFFREY: There was also another individual that, as I say, I couldn't identify. I don't know what his affiliation was.
Mr. HUGHES: What did you say during the briefing?
Mr. CAFFREY: Well, I brought them up to speed as to where we were with the investigation in terms of the fact that the drugs were back in the United States. This was a photograph of who was in the picture. There were some questions asked of me what our intentions were generally and I told them you know, generally what we were going to attempt to do was to go back and pay for the drugs, that we had some problems to work out with the U.S. Attorney's office, who was somewhat hesitant about us going back, for justifiable reasons, but we felt it was an operational decision that we would ultimately make in the DEA.
Mr. HUGHES: Did you describe to them the significance of this operation?
Mr. CAFFREY: Yes sir. They were very well aware of the significance of it. In fact, the CIA representative, in pointing out Frederico Vaughn in the photographs, I knew that Frederico Vaughn was a defendant in a case, but frankly, I didn't really know he was, and the CIA representative told me that he was an associate of a government official, a Nicaraguan government official, which was news to me at the time.
Mr. HUGHES: That is news to me too, because the CIA tells us they don't know anything about him. But they understood the significance, that we were talking about high level traffickers?
Mr. CAFFREY: Yes sir.
Mr. HUGHES: Escobar, Ochoa?
Mr. CAFFREY: Yes. The CIA had assisted us prior to my briefing of them. They in fact assisted us in putting cameras on the aircraft.
Mr. HUGHES: What did they say. Who carried the conversation for the other agencies?
Mr. CAFFREY: Most of the conversation was Colonel North.
Mr. HUGHES: Did he conduct the meeting as such?
Mr. CAFFREY: Yes sir.
Mr. HUGHES: What did he say during the meeting?
Mr. CAFFREY: Well, he asked our intentions as to whether we were going to go back. He voiced his opinion that it was probably a dangerous thing to send the informant back in, particularly in light of the fact that at one point during this investigation the informant had been shot down and incarcerated, so to speak, at the airport. Colonel North asked me hypothetically if we were going to return with the aircraft and the money, why we couldn't land the plane somewhere outside of Nicaragua, outside the airport in Managua, and maybe turn the money over to the contras. I told him that was really out of the question because it would jeopardize our informant. It was more a hypothetical question.
Mr. HUGHES: Oliver North was asking you if it was possible for you to land the plane with the million and a half dollars outside of Managua?
Mr. CAFFREY: If it was possible for Seal to land the plane.
Mr. HUGHES: Seal to land the plane outside of Managua so that the money could be channeled to the contras?
Mr. CAFFREY: Yes sir.
Mr. HUGHES: And you told him that that was not possible, that would jeopardize Barry Seal to begin with, and of course, that wouldn't be proper anyway, would it?
Mr. CAFFREY: Right.
Mr. HUGHES: You indicated that Oliver North expressed some concern about perhaps jeopardizing Barry Seal. Did Oliver North also suggest to you any other reasons why that operation shouldn't go off as planned?
Mr. CAFFREY: No, but he did ask me when this investigation could go public, when the information could be released, and I said certainly at some point in time it would, but we had a lot of things to finish off the investigation prior to that.
Mr. HUGHES: Isn't it a fact Oliver North wanted to go public then and there with it?
Mr. CAFFREY: I don't recall that he suggested we go public. He asked me if we could, or when we could actually, when we go.
Mr. HUGHES: Why did he say it was important to go public with it?
Mr. CAFFREY: He did indicate to me there was a vote coming up at some point in time on an appropriations bill to fund the contras.
Mr. HUGHES: So he wanted too public because there was a contra aid vote coming up before the Congress?
Mr. CAFFREY: Yes sir.
Mr. HUGHES: And he told you that?
Mr. CAFFREY: He mentioned it in a conversation.
Mr. HUGHES: And what did you say to him?
Mr. CAFFREY: I told him that public disclosures would probably be made by the U.S. Attorney's Office at the proper time, but that we had a number of things that we still had to do in the investigation, namely, we had arrests to make and we had to pursue some - we had a lot of goals left in the investigation, some of which we were going to have to accomplish in a relatively short period of time.
Mr. HUGHES: Well, the fact of the matter is that Barry Seal had made tremendous inroads into this Medellin cartel, had he not?
Mr. CAFFREY: Yes sir.
Mr. HUGHES: You were familiar with the fact that he was trusted. In fact, to your knowledge, they suggested that they wanted to take him, show him their assets, wanted to take him to the Yucatan Penninsula in Mexico, and in fact, when it appeared in the press, in the Washington Times, he was on his way?
Mr. CAFFREY: Well, some of that information developed subsequent to my briefing with Colonel North, as I recall. We did know what his capabilities were, but on the other hand, we recognized that we had taken cocaine out of the country and had delivered it to defendants n Miami, had arrested them. We had taken - we were about to go back with money to make a payoff. There is not too many times we could do that and him to continue that way, but contemporaneous with that, we did have these other goals in the investigation.
Mr. HUGHES: How long have you been with DEA?
Mr. CAFFREY: Twenty-four years.
Mr. HUGHES: In your 24 years do you ever recall a confidential informant, an operative, working their way into those levels of a major cartel?
Mr. CAFFREY: We have had a number of real good investigations but I would say this was a top notch investigation.
Mr. HUGHES: Did you ever recall an opportunity to reach the kingpin of a cartel all at one time, as Barry Seal was in this operation?
Mr. CAFFREY: From an operational standpoint. I don't recall any. We have had a number of investigations that have resulted with potential indictments against - historical conspiracies against -
Mr. HUGHES: The reason it was important for this operation to move ahead was because that potential existed to learn much more about the organization, about their assets?
Mr. CAFFREY: That was a goal, but one of the primary goals was actually the arrest of the principals.
Mr. HUGHES: The arrest of Ochoa?
Mr. CAFFREY: Yes.
Mr. HUGHES: And Escobar, and you were close to them. In fact your operative was with them, traveling with them, staying at their residences and had worked his way into their confidence. So you were very close to that operation?
Mr. CAFFREY: We were very close to the operation but we were also our informant, Seal - was in a precarious position at the time in a sense that they had begun to check him out. He had already delivered cocaine back into the United States and people had been arrested subsequent to the delivery of that. So I mean, we were not about to end our investigation at that point, but we realized that we were on the clock so to speak, in terms of trying to achieve the goals that we had in the investigation....
Mr. HUGHES: Did you explain to Oliver North when he suggested that this operation be released - to utilize the photographs, I presume that were taken of the transfer of the narcotics in Managua to get that out to the press - did you suggest to him that that could put Barry Seal at risk?
Mr. CAFFREY: We didn't discuss putting the photographs out in the press. What he asked is could the story be told in the press, that is, the story about flying into Nicaragua and the government being involved. We didn't discuss the photographs being released. That was not discussed, as I recall.
Mr. HUGHES: What he wanted to get out was there was an instance where Sandinistas were involved in drug running?
Mr. CAFFREY: Yes sir.
Mr. HUGHES: That was the principal interest?
Mr. CAFFREY: That wasn't his principal interest, but he wanted to know how long was the case going to go on, what else did we plan on doing, and so forth.
Mr. HUGHES: Had you been to the National Security Council to brief them on any other drug operations?
Mr. CAFFREY: I had not.
Mr. HUGHES: Since then have you?
Mr. CAFFREY: I may have attended another meeting where I didn't actually do the briefing but - and it was during this time frame - but I just can't recall.
Mr. HUGHES: Isn't it unusual for the NSC to be interested in law enforcement operations?
Mr. CAFFREY: It is the first time in my experience.
Mr. HUGHES: You have been at DEA for 24 years. Is that the first time you had that experience?
Mr. CAFFREY: Well, we have worked with CIA overseas on occasion.
Mr. HUGHES: Any question in your mind that the reason that Oliver North was interested was because it was Sandinistas involving drug trafficking.
Mr. CAFFREY: He was concerned about that.
Mr. HUGHES: An entry in Oliver North's notebook dated June 27 - I am going to ask one of our staff to put it up - lists some topics under the heading "drug case." I want to direct your attention to this document. Do you recognize some of the topics? Can you read that?
Mr. CAFFREY: It contains the names of some of the defendants in the case but the actual date really doesn't have much significance.
Mr. HUGHES: It has no significance?
Mr. CAFFREY: Not to me it doesn't, no.
Mr. HUGHES: But you did discuss the DEA program of controlling cocaine?
Mr. CAFFREY: I beg your pardon?
Mr. HUGHES: You did discuss the DEA program of controlling cocaine?
Mr. CAFFREY: I did?
Mr. HUGHES: I am asking the question. I don't know.
Mr. CAFFREY: In my conversation with North, and I don't believe it was on the 27th -
Mr. HUGHES: When do you think it was?
Mr. CAFFREY: I think it was after that.
Mr. WESTRATE: Mr. Chairman, I think that relates to a brief I had on the 27th.
Mr. HUGHES: I see. Are there any other matters discussed with Oliver North and this person Dewey? I presume you are referring to Dewey Clarridge. Any other discussions at that meeting?
Mr. CAFFREY: No. The meeting ended just with what I thought was the general understanding that we were probably going to go back with the money. We had not really finalized that plan yet. We had to get permission from our boss, but that was how I left off the meeting.
Mr. HUGHES: How many times did Oliver North suggest to you that the operation should be aborted and go public with it?
Mr. CAFFREY: I don't know that he said it should be aborted necessarily. He didn't think it was a good idea that the informant should go back down there. I seem to recall that after that meeting, I had a conversation with him. I don't know whether it was on the phone or whether I actually went over and talked to him, but when we in fact had decided that we were going to go back and make the payment with the money, and he expressed surprise that we were going back, which indicated maybe we had some misunderstanding the previous time, that he thought we weren't. But all I really left off with him previously was we hadn't made a final decision to go back yet, but probably we would go back.
Mr. HUGHES: How many times did Oliver North indicate to you that he felt that you ought to go public with it because of the contra vote coming up?
Mr. CAFFREY: He just mentioned that one time during the course of our briefing. As I say, I was doing the briefing, so I was doing most of the talking, and some of the questions he posed -
Mr. HUGHES: Did you report or tell your superiors about Oliver North's suggestion that the plane be landed in another country besides Nicaragua and divert the $1.5 million to the Contras?
Mr. CAFFREY: I am not sure that I did that. My conversations when I came back really related more to the possible publicity, possible - that there were a number of people now more conversant with the case. I think my concerns were more in that area.
Mr. HUGHES: Did you have any other briefings with the National Security Council after that?
Mr. CAFFREY: Did I?
Mr. HUGHES: Yes.
Mr. CAFFREY: I don't recall that I had, but it is possible that I may have attended another meeting, but I just - I remember the one specifically prior to the trip back with the money, because I was conducting the briefing. I may have been in another one, attended one with someone else who was really running the meeting, but off hand, I don't recall.
Mr. HUGHES: Did there come a time when you learned that the operation was compromised and the media had it, had the story?
Mr. CAFFREY: Yes. That was the middle of July. I am not all that conversant with that aspect of it, but there was a story that was coming out in the papers.
Mr. HUGHES: Did you find out about it before the story came out?
Mr. CAFFREY: I did not, but I believe somebody else in DEA did.
Mr. HUGHES: Did you ever conduct an investigation of the source of the leaks?
Mr. CAFFREY: I did not personally, no.
Mr. HUGHES: Did you participate in any meetings where that suggestion was made?
Mr. CAFFREY: I don't recall that I did, no.
Mr. HUGHES: Once the story was out to the Washington Times, then the operation was clearly exposed?
Mr. CAFFREY: Yes. Seal's viability operationally was over. He was now a witness and not an operator.
Mr. HUGHES: So there is no question that he was of no further use as an operator, as a confidential informant at that point?
Mr. CAFFREY: No. His utility after that would be as a witness.
Mr. HUGHES: When that story broke was Seal in this country?
Mr. CAFFREY: I am not sure where he was.
Mr. HUGHES: You don't have any personal knowledge?
Mr. CAFFREY: I am sure the case agents knew where he was.
Mr. McCOLLUM. I am trying to get a clarification. I wanted to know if he was asking the whole panel or just you, Mr. CAFFREY: I think we are doing it one at a time even though we have a panel. I think will do it that way. Mr. Caffrey, how long did this briefing last with Colonel North?
Mr. CAFFREY: About an hour.
Mr. McCOLLUM. It was a briefing that you gave to him, and the CIA also participated in the actual briefing.
Mr. CAFFREY: Yes, sir.
Mr. McCOLLUM. This was at his request?
Mr. CAFFREY: On whose request - my boss told me to go over and give him a briefing, so this is what I did.
Mr. McCOLLUM. There was no indication from North as to how he happened to be aware of this to ask for a briefing o to be given one or anything like that?
Mr. CAFFREY: No, but I gave him the briefing. They were pretty conversant with the operation.
Mr. McCOLLUM. There has been an implication in earlier testimony that a White House aide, I suppose the implication is that it might be North, was the one who leaked this story to the press. You have told us about the briefing. You told us that North would like to have - at one point indicated he would like to have had this information released or the story available. Do you have any actual knowledge that Oliver North or anyone at the National Security Council did in fact leak this information to the press?
Mr. CAFFREY: No, I don't. I don't know who leaked it. I just know I didn't leak it.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Understood. That is fair enough. In the process of an investigation involving informants like this, Mr. Caffrey, where you got somebody such as Barry Seal involved, you go through using him for a period of time, what makes this witness credible or not to you, what makes this informant credible?
Mr. CAFFREY: When he tells us something that we are able to corroborate through physical evidence or intelligence or through other witnesses or other informants or from observations made by our agents.
Mr. McCOLLUM. And it was on this basis that you decided to use Barry Seal because that type of information had come forward.
Mr. CAFFREY: Yes, sir, plus he was a pilot, a desirable commodity for smugglers.
Mr. McCOLLUM. How did you first get involved in this yourself? I know you were here in the Washington office. Is this routine for you to oversee, or was this a special kind of a case because of the nature of it or how did it come to your attention to begin with?
Mr. CAFFREY: There is a cocaine section we functionalize in the DEA, cocaine and heroin section. It is our responsibility in our section to monitor and coordinate most of the high caliber cocaine cases. We don't supervise the cases or conduct the investigation. That is done in the field level. But where there is special emphasis needed, if there is extra recourses required, or special authorities like foreign travel, things of that nature, or some investigation of a sensitive nature, we would be more conversant with those cases than we would be with the run of the mill street cases. That was our function that we had staff coordinators responsible for various geographical areas of the world.
Mr. McCOLLUM. You were responsible for this area.
Mr. CAFFREY: I was responsible for all cocaine and I had staff, about eight or nine staff coordinators at the time working for me who had responsibility, one of whom had responsibility for this case.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Who had that responsibility.
Mr. CAFFREY: I believe it was Frank White.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Would you have had any direct contact with Mr. Jacobsen who was the agent out in the field that we had as a witness this morning.
Mr. CAFFREY: I don't believe so. I am not saying that that doesn't happen but I don't recall that in the investigation I had any contact with him. I think I had most of my contacts with Miami and with the special agent in charge.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Who was?
Mr. CAFFREY:Mr. Joura.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Some of the contacts go through Mr. White because he was directly -
Mr. CAFFREY:Mr. White would be the person that handled a lot of the details, requirements, if they needed money or equipment or special authorities.
Mr. MCCOLLUM. Who would you report to in your chain of command at that time.
Mr. CAFFREY: Mr. Westrate.
Mr. McCOLLUM. Who directed you to give the briefing to Ollie North?
Mr. CAFFREY: I believe Mr. Westrate....
Mr. HUGHES: Mr. Monastero, if I might, you are now retired from the Drug Enforcement Administration.
Mr. MONASTERO. That is correct.
Mr. HUGHES: How many years did you serve with the DEA?
Mr. MONASTERO. I served the entire time DEA was formed 1973, with the prior agency and the agency prior to that.
Mr. HUGHES: When did you retire from DEA?
Mr. MONASTERO. June 30 of 1985.
Mr. HUGHES: What was your position at that time?
Mr. MONASTERO. I was the Chief of Operations, the Assistant Administrator for Operations.
Mr. HUGHES: Assistant Administrator for Operations.
Mr. MONASTERO. Yes.
Mr. HUGHES: Actually, you were in charge of all operations.
Mr. MONASTERO. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. HUGHES: Worldwide.
Mr. MONASTERO. Yes....
Mr. HUGHES: Did you participate in any meetings at the National Security Council?
Mr. MONASTERO. I did not.
Mr. HUGHES: You did not. Did you appear with - did you go to any meetings where the leak was discussed, where you were attempting to do something about the leak?
Mr. MONASTERO. Go to any meetings?
Mr. HUGHES: Yes. Did you attempt to do something about the
Mr. MONASTERO. Well, I went to a meeting on the 17th of July, the day that the leak or that the first press, direct press information appeared in the press. I was asked to go to brief Carlton Turner, who was the Drug Policy Advisor at the White House, on the investigation. At that meeting, there was a discussion of the investigation and of the leak at that time.
Mr. HUGHES: Was there an investigation underway to try to identify the source of the leak?
Mr. MONASTERO. There was no investigation of the leak at that time, no.
Mr. HUGHES: Did you as Carlton Turner if he had any knowledge about the leak?
Mr. MONASTERO. The recollection that I have of the meeting was to the effect that he asked me about the investigation and the leak. It was obvious from our conversation that he had considerable amount of information about the investigation. The inference that I drew from some of what he said was that he was accusing us, accusing DEA, of leaking the story. I became quite irritated with that, got quite upset, and let him know in no uncertain terms, as I recall, that I thought the leak came from the White House, because of the contra support vote that was upcoming and that we had no intention of leaking the story. That, as a matter of fact, if whoever did leak it would have waited just a little bit longer, they would have had more incriminating information about what involvement the Sandinista Government, in fact, may have had in that case.
Mr. HUGHES: Is that the first time with the Barry Seal, Nicaragua case that you were privy to any information that the Nicaraguans, Sandinistas or anybody else in Nicaragua was trafficking in drugs?
Mr. MONASTERO. The Barry Seal case?
Mr. HUGHES: Yes.
Mr. MONASTERO. As far as I can recall, yes.
Mr. HUGHES: Do you recall after that case any information coming to your attention involving the Sandinistas, drug trafficking?
Mr. MONASTERO. No.
Mr. HUGHES: So that was the only instance?
Mr. MONASTERO. To my recollection, it was, yes.
Mr. HUGHES: Did you become aware of the suggestion that was made apparently by Oliver North to Mr. Caffrey that perhaps playing with the $1.1 million which might be sent down in another country, where the money could be channeled to the contras?
Mr. MONASTERO. I think Mr. Caffrey said it would land outside of Managua, but in Nicaragua, but, no, I don't have any recollection of being told that at the time, and, frankly, if he did tell me, I wouldn't at that time have realized the significance of that.
Mr. HUGHES: You would not have realized it?
Mr. MONASTERO. I wouldn't have realized it at that time because nobody knew that Oliver North was doing what he was doing.
Mr. HUGHES: I see....
Mr. HUGHES: To your knowledge, who had the information about the operation beside DEA?
Mr. MONASTERO. To my knowledge, certain people, and I can't go through a litany of names, at the White House knew about it. People at the CIA certainly knew about it. There were people in the Defense Department, although I think, well, there were people in the Defense Department who knew about it. There may have been people in other agencies that I am not aware of that may have known about it. But those agencies certainly besides DEA knew about the investigation.
Mr. HUGHES: Did you participate in any of the discussions with (IA at any point when they were attempting to release the information, when they were trying to get it released publicly?
Mr. MONASTERO. l am not aware that the CIA was ever - I heard the testimony this morning. That is the first time I heard that.
Mr. HUGHES: You have no knowledge of that, though?
Mr. MONASTERO. Not the CIA, no.
Mr. HUGHES: Mr. Westrate, you are presently with the DEA, are you not?
Mr. WESTRATE. I am currently the Assistant Administrator for Operations.
Mr. HUGHES: What was your position in May and June and July of 1984?
Mr. WESTRATE. Mr. Monastero's deputy, so I was a Deputy Assistant for Operations.
Mr. HUGHES: Deputy Assistant for Operations?
Mr. WESTRATE. Yes, sir.
Mr. HUGHES: Did there come a time when you became aware of the Barry Seal operation?
Mr. WESTRATE. Yes, sir, during the same time frame, May, June, and July of 1984.
Mr. HUGHES: HOW did you become aware of it?
Mr. WESTRATE. Through the normal course of business.
Mr. HUGHES: Were you the contact person in operations?
Mr. WESTRATE. Well, I supervised all of the drug desks, so I was the natural conduit between the drug desk and Mr. Monastero.
Mr. HUGHES: Mr. Caffrey reported directly to you?
Mr. WESTRATE. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Mr. HUGHES: You were aware from the very beginning that it was brought to the - that Barry Seal was brought to your attention?
Mr. WESTRATE. Well, I don't think necessarily the minute he was debriefed because as we developed into the potential of actually making a trip to Nicaragua I was certainly brought in because that was very sensitive.
Mr. HUGHES: What was your role during that period of time?
Mr. WESTRATE. My role was normal supervision, coordination down with Mr. Caffrey, up with Mr. Monastero and some interaction activities.
Mr. HUGHES: Did you attend any briefings at the National Security Council?
Mr. WESTRATE. Yes, sir, I did. I attended two meetings at the White House. One on June 27th and a second one on June 29th.
Mr. HUGHES: Who was present at the meeting on June 27th?
Mr. WESTRATE. On June 27, there was myself, Colonel North, Mr. Dewey Clarridge of the CIA, Kennedy Grafanrid, who was, as I understood, assistant to the President and Greg Johnstone of the Office of Indian Affairs at the State Department.
Mr. HUGHES: Who conducted the meeting?
Mr. WESTRATE. Colonel North.
Mr. HUGHES: What was discussed at the meeting?
Mr. WESTRATE. There were a number of issues discussed at the meeting. The meeting opened with a presentation of the photographs by Mr. Clarridge. The photos were passed around the room and discussed. The second thing that we discussed was whether or not to release, the release of the facts in this case would in any way influence the pending vote on the Congress. And interestingly enough the conclusion of the group was that it probably, in the end, would not. We also discussed at some length the rules about press releases in cases. most of which I led, because I wanted to make certain that everybody understood that there was within the criminal justice system a very strict protocol on media coverage of investigations, and we were quite concerned that - I wanted to be certain nothing happened in this case that would be different from another case, because clearly we expected to be prosecuting some of the most major cocaine traffickers in the world, and didn't want to prejudice the prosecution. So I explained at length the Department of Justice rules and how generally we don't comment beyond as is often said the four corners of an indictment and so forth. There also was some discussion about how details of an investigation would or could come out and my objection was that something as high visibility as this, in my view, having watched cases over the years, that if the regular announcement were made, the media, as strong as it is, probably within a few days would elaborate considerably. That just seems to be the way things go. So we discussed that. And we also discussed at length the future, the potential that we felt that this investigation had. This meeting was the day after the cocaine had arrived in Miami, so the thing was really cooking at that point. That meeting lasted quite awhile. And Friday, June 29, we attended -
Mr. HUGHES: Before you move on to the 29th of June, what prompted the discussion about the operation and how that would impact the contras? Who raised that issue?
Mr. WESTRATE. I don't remember who actually raised that.
Mr. HUGHES: What relevance would that have to this investigation? What difference does it make?
Mr. WESTRATE. I think it was quite clear, Mr. Chairman, that the people at the White House felt that having derogatory information on members of the Sandinista government would be helpful in this vote.
Mr. HUGHES: As a law enforcement officer, it wouldn't make any difference to you what the politics were about the individuals, would it?
Mr. WESTRATE. No, sir, it would not.
Mr. HUGHES: Obviously it was raised by somebody from the White House?
Mr. WESTRATE. Yes, because they clearly were interested in this.
Mr. HUGHES: You didn't raise it, did you?
Mr. WESTRATE. No, I did not. That doesn't mean they wanted to disclose it prematurely but they were certainly interested in as soon as possible. This would be useful was the general tone of it. I wasn't sure it would be useful. More cocaine traffickers, there are so many everywhere that we weren't sure they would have any impact at all. There was quite a discussion on that very subject.
Mr. HUGHES: What precipitated your discussion with them concerning the rules of the Justice Department with regard to releasing information and the extent of the operation, nature of the operation, was it a discussion that perhaps it might be released in connection with an upcoming contra vote?
Mr. WESTRATE. I think there were some assumptions made by people there who were not familiar with the investigative process in handling the press about cases, that all the details could be disclosed including photographs and, you know, other things that would normally in my context be evidentiary or perhaps grand jury information, or be, you know, speculative or what have you, which we don't do in the investigative process, press releases.
Mr. HUGHES: Was that, did that discussion come from Dewey Clarridge or from Oliver North or where did it come from?
Mr. WESTRATE. I really don't recall, sir. It was four years ago and
Mr. HUGHES: Mr. Caffrey's recollection was it came from Oliver North. You have information to that fact or to contradict that?
Mr. WESTRATE. It may have. I don't recall specifically.
Mr. HUGHES: The meeting of the 29th, who was present at that meeting and what was discussed?
Mr. WESTRATE. At that meeting,Mr. Caffrey was present. He and I went there, according to my notes, Mr. Clarridge, Mr. North, and again, Mr. Johnstone. The purpose of this meeting was to just keep everybody up to date and also to report the fact that the cocaine had actually now been delivered and the seizure played in Miami. Again to reiterate the fact that we had future plans and we were going to proceed with our future plans.
Mr. HUGHES: Had you been to the White House, on the operation, like on-going operations such as this before?
Mr. WESTRATE. Not on this particular thing, but I have been there a couple times since on very sensitive cases.
Mr. HUGHES: That is the exception rather than the rule, is it?
Mr. WESTRATE. Yes, it is.
---- End Forwarded Message
I find it interesting that Mitch McConnell was a Jefferson County Kentucky Judge from 77'-84' and then in 84' right into senate.
Things that make ya go...oh right!
🤯