WORMSCAN: MENA0 [PART 6]
Mena, Arkansas, base of CIA drug importation.
NOTES: I made a few corrections to spellings and grammar.
I am no longer editing out the address of David P Beiter. It is an address of a place that doesn’t exist. As if his identity weren’t shrouded in mystery already.
If you missed previous parts to this part of the WORMSCAN series, you can find it here.
Date: Wed Sep 13, 1995 9:57 pm CST
From: Orlin Grabbe
EMS: INTERNET / MCI ID: 376-5414
MBX: kalliste@delphi.com
TO: * David Beiter / MCI ID: 635-1762
Subject: part 25: vince foster, the nsa, and bank spying
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Allegations Regarding Vince Foster, the NSA, and Banking Transactions Spying, Part XXV
by J. Orlin Grabbe
What ties together cocaine in Arkansas, an assassinated Vince Foster, Systematics banking software, NSA codes diverted to the Israelis, hidden accounts at Pittsburgh's Mellon Bank, Iraq-bound technology from Westinghouse and Kennametal (perhaps smuggled or escorted by Wackenhut security), and bipartisan political payola?
One common thread concerns a global money-laundering operation run out of Lima, Peru.
Just as two banks will not be sufficient to form an efficient foreign exchange market, neither can a couple of isolated institutions effectively launder money. Therefore anyone with large amounts of "dirty" money to process must ultimately intersect with the global market for the flow of laundered cash. A principal reason has to do with *layering*.
Classical money laundering involves three stages: placement, layering, and integration. *Placement* is getting cash into the system. This usually involves a friendly banker who doesn't fill out reporting forms. *Layering* is a chain of transactions (these are often interbank transactions) at least one of which needs to be invisible in order to effectively break the monetary trail. *Integration* is getting the "clean" money back to the original owner. This may take many forms, including offshore "loans" which are never repaid.
Here is a thumbnail sketch of some of the money-laundering inter-connections among the various subjects of discussion that have arisen in this series of Internet posts.
1. Cocaine smuggled through Mena, Arkansas and elsewhere (including, currently, the cross-border flow from Canada and Mexico) generates huge cash profits which must be laundered.
I first learned of the Arkansas drug-related laundry around 1983, about three years after it had gone into operation. Nicolas Ardito-Barletta was then a World Bank economist, but one who would shortly become President of Panama (prior to General Noriega). Nicolas' brother took my class on international financial markets at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, and afterward wrote his advanced study project paper on Panama as an international banking center under my supervision. The paper focused on the economic incentives offered by the Panamanian banking system. But privately we discussed the obvious demand for banking services generated by the intercontinental cocaine trade. The Arkansas laundry was well-known to Panamanian bankers.
2. Prohibitions on the export of weapons or advanced technology similarly creates a profit opportunity for those willing to subvert that prohibition. So another source of demand for laundering services comes from smuggled nuclear technology, nuclear fuel, and arms shipments.
Pittsburgh — whose environs encompass Kennametal, parts of Westinghouse, and Mellon Bank — was a focal point for the latter operation. Kennametal machine tools and Westinghouse nose cones were shipped up the St. Lawrence to Montreal for forwarding to Iraq. (Parts of the story of the arming of Iraq may be found in Alan Friedman's *Spider's Web*; other parts may be found in *Time*, "A Matter of Honor", June 21, 1993. There is still much more untold.)
Has Westinghouse just been indicted for price-fixing? What about Kennametal? Does some of the evidence involve the Mellon Bank money-laundering operation? Has the money-laundering operation formerly run through Mellon Bank now been moved to New York?
In the event the exchange involves arms for oil, the oil must be brokered, sold, and the cash transferred to the relevant party. The commodity divisions of investment banks are often involved in this part of the transaction (a number of examples along this line involve the defunct Drexel Burnham Lambert, one of my former software clients).
3. Prohibitions on the sharing of "classified" information create a profit opportunity for those willing to sell restricted information. This is commonly known as "espionage", and those who commit it — like Jonathan Pollard, Aldrich Ames, and Vince Foster — often end up in prison or dead or both.
In this case the amount of money involved is often small. Concealment is important, nevertheless, so the payoff — if not in cash — often occurs through channels otherwise used for the laundry.
Foster received deposits in offshore accounts for selling nuclear codes. He was paid via covert channels. So also — one suspects — were the hit men who took him out.
(The fact that Robert Goetzman used the royal "we" in "we did Foster" on the day of Foster's death — in Debra von Trapp's account — does not prove to me that he was actually involved in the hit, even if the conversation occurred exactly as related. After all, there are probably many people who would like to enhance their prestige by claiming credit for the Foster assassination. But the timing of the conversation would indicate Goetzman knew about it at approximately the time it occurred. Did he have *advance* knowledge of the hit? Does he even now know the identity of the contract agents involved?)
4. The Cabazon Indian nation comes into the story because, being a sovereign nation, it was a way to avoid export restrictions and to develop new weapons technology. It was also one of the sites where Michael Riconosciuto helped create a backdoor version of the PROMIS software. Even those sources who tell me that Riconosciuto "lies a lot" confirm that he worked on the PROMIS software to develop a mechanism for covert telecommunications access.
The PROMIS software enters the story in three ways: it is a mechanism for tracking people, a mechanism for tracking money, and a useful tool for managing a global laundry.
5. The early 1980s mandate to track terrorists (a "terrorist" being defined as anyone who does things normally reserved for government agencies) involved tracking the money and tracking the people. PROMIS was designed to track people. It was especially useful in tracking spies and other outsiders, the natural users of the parallel monetary system, the global laundry. Sales of the PROMIS software to security organization around the world were made by Earl Brian, recently indicted in California and, reportedly, also Canada (along with the noted alleged con artist, Ari Ben-Menasche).
6. The PROMIS software was modified to track money, and sold to bank back-offices across the country and around the world by a Little Rock company called Systematics (now Alltel Information Services). The telecommunications backdoor in the software was intended by the NSA to be used to spy on bank transactions in real time. But there were also other possibilities, soon apparent to enterprising souls.
If you run the back offices of banks, then you are in a position to make — and keep track of — covert transfers through the "backdoor" mechanism of PROMIS. That is, such transfers could take place in such a way that one would not leave an audit trail, and in such a way that the funds would never show up in the ordinary accounting reports. That is, the same software was an excellent way to manage the global laundry.
7. Despite the distributed nature of the software-controlled back-office operation, the laundry in the U.S. has been mostly concentrated in a couple of dozen financial institutions.
How could this escape the scrutiny of the Federal Reserve? The answer is: Through complicity at a very high level. What does Alan Greenspan have to say about all this? (Did you get the letter?)
8. But the back-door created a massive security hole in the operation of banking cash-management and wire-transfer services. Banks had gone out and purchased a software vault with a massive steel door on the front, but a secret entrance and exit to be used by enterprising thieves.
Did Alltel Information Services recently hire four more law firms to represent it in the inevitable lawsuits to come?
Is this why Ross Perot is getting into the banking software business?
Swiss Bank Corp. recently acquired a 24.9 percent stake in Perot Systems Corp., which will form a new division called Perot Systems Global Financial Services to run the bank's computer operations. Perot Systems in turn is taking a 40 percent stake in Systor, a Swiss Bank Corp. subsidiary that provides banking software.
Meanwhile, a 28-year-old Vladimir "Vova" Levin of St. Petersburg, Russia, was recently reported to have, in connection with some others, penetrated Citicorp's cash management services in New York, and transferred more than $10 million to banks in six other countries (including Switzerland and Israel). Although the hackers were caught, due to excessive greed, a hefty $400,000 was not recovered.
How were they able to bypass Citibank's security procedures? "Is there a mole in Citibank?" a *Wall Street Journal* headline recently asked. A more perceptive headline would have asked, "Is there a *hole* in Citibank software?" Some people think the hackers utilized the PROMIS system backdoor (the "Greek" method).
Some people who are totally devoid of expertise in banking technology have questioned the ability of a group of (possibly CIA) "Fifth Column" hackers to clean out accounts in Switzerland using a computer, whether Cray or otherwise. Well, duuuuuh, let's see, a Russian graduate student with modest equipment accomplished the same thing from *St. Petersburg* using the *Russian phone system*. Just think of what he might have been able to do if he had had some advantages . . .
Others wonder why Swiss banks haven't been publicly screaming about a missing billion or two. Well, their computers thought the transfers were duly authorized. Do you really expect the banks to worry about making restitution? (We are not dealing with pissant ATM theft here.) Secondly, Switzerland houses much of the world's flight capital. Wonder what would happen to a lot of it, if Swiss banks admitted to a hacker vulnerability?
But not to worry. Anyone can get his money back by identifying the amount, the account number, and signing a *sworn* statement that the account in question belonges to him . . .
Finally, others question the ability of anyone to saunter through the Mossad's files. Why? You might not even need a computer. If you think much of the U.S. government is for sale, you should take a good look at Israel's. And, at any rate, the Mossad is currently a third-rate intelligence organization in chaos. Hardly a fortress on a hill.
[to be continued]
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Date: Thu Sep 14, 1995 8:26 am CST
From: Duane Roberts
EMS: INTERNET / MCI ID: 376-5414
MBX: eaou669@aldebaran.oac.uci.edu
TO: * David Beiter / MCI ID: 635-1762
Subject: MENA - Excerpt from a letter to Congressman Doug Barnard, Jr.
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CONTINUED INVESTIGATION OF SENIOR-LEVEL EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT AND MISMANAGEMENT AT THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE:
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Hearing before the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, First Session, July 24, 1991.
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Washington : U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs., Congressional Sales Office, 1992.
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GOV DOC # Y 4.G 74/7:Em 7/16
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The following excerpt is from a letter written by former IRS senior Criminal Investigator William C. Duncan to Representative Doug Barnard, Jr. (D-Georgia), former Chairman of the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee.
From page 311.
(2.B.) WHY DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THEY WANTED OR NEED TO SUPPRESS YOUR TESTIMONY?
Recent sworn testimony from several witnesses concerning events in the Mena, AR area, indicates that the United States Government had interests which would have not been best served by unobstructed completion of IRS and Arkansas State police money laundering and drug smuggling investigations. Nor would their interests have been well served by exposure of interference in the investigations through testimony before the Subcommittee on Crime. I believe that someone in the IRS was told to suppress my testimony in an attempt to protect other United States Government interests at the Mena, AR Airport. The cooperating Arkansas State Police Investigator has stated that he was told twice during 1987 by FBI Agents that the Central Intelligence Agency was involved in some sort of operation at the airport. He also stated that he saw an FBI teletype which referred to the CIA operation and the United States Attorney's Office interference in our investigations into allegations of drug smuggling and money laundering by Barry Seal and/or associates of Seal. This interference was exactly what the Subcommittee on Crime wanted me to testify about.
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Date: Thu Sep 14, 1995 8:42 am CST
From: Duane Roberts
EMS: INTERNET / MCI ID: 376-5414
MBX: eaou669@aldebaran.oac.uci.edu
TO: * David Beiter / MCI ID: 635-1762
Subject: MENA — The Sworn Testimony of Chief Investigator William C. Duncan
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CONTINUED INVESTIGATION OF SENIOR-LEVEL EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT AND MISMANAGEMENT AT THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE:
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Hearing before the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, First Session, July 24, 1991.
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Washington : U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs., Congressional Sales Office, 1992.
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GOV DOC # Y 4.G 74/7:Em 7/16
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The following excerpts are from pages 64-73, 85-86.
Representative Doug Barnard, Jr. (D-Georgia) was Chairman of the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee in 1991.
Mr. BARNARD: Thank you very much.
Our next panel consists of Mr. William C. Duncan, a former IRS senior Criminal Investigation employee, and Mr. N. Paul Whitmore, group manager of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service.
Gentlemen, we appreciate you again being with us today for this important hearing. We will include your entire testimony, without objection, in the record and would like for your statements, if possible, to be summarized. Thank you again for being with us.
We will first hear from Mr. Duncan. Incidentally, I want to congratulate you I understand that you are now gainfully employed again.
Mr. DUNCAN: I finally got a job; yes, sir.
Mr. BARNARD: Chief investigator of the Arkansas attorney general's office. I am glad that you are now employed.
Mr. DUNCAN: Thank you, sir. Would it be better if I just responded to questions from the panel because it takes about 20 to 25 minutes for me to read this?
Mr. BARNARD: Could you just sort of summarize to begin with? We have some questions for you and Mr. Whitmore, but couldn't you just sort of summarize what your statement includes?
Mr. DUNCAN: This was my summary.
Mr. BARNARD: A 20-page summary.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. DUNCAN, CHIEF INVESTIGATOR, OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF ARKANSAS
Mr. DUNCAN: No, sir. It is about 9 pages.
I can just say that Mr. Whitmore and I have testified truthfully about the events that occurred in connection with my testimony before the Subcommittee on Crime and m briefing process. We have provided documentation pertaining to our trips here. We have testified on several occasions, and we volunteered for and submitted to polygraph exams which we passed. And we also cooperated with Treasury IG in their extensive investigation. I don't know what more we can do.
Mr. BARNARD. Well, we have some questions that we will direct to you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Duncan follows]
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM C. DUNCAN BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, CONSUMER, AND MONETARY AFFAIRS HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
JULY 24, 1991
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. Since my testimony before you on July 27, 1989, I have cooperated completely with investigators from the U. S. Treasury, Inspector General's Office and Government Accounting Office in an attempt to deal with the integrity problems and criminal acts of IRS Chief Counsel Attorneys. To my knowledge, not one of the IRS Attorneys has been punished, additional IRS Executives apparently have provided false, misleading or incomplete testimony to Treasury IG Investigators, and the conspiracy to cover up the illegal acts continues. The system now in place for investigating Senior Level IRS integrity problems has not worked.
My prior testimony before you related to instructions given to me by IRS Chief Counsel Attorneys concerning my testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime on February 26, 1988, about criminal investigations in which I participated while assigned as an IRS Special Agent to the Fayetteville, AR Post-of-Duty. These joint investigations were initiated because of information which we received during 1983 and 1984 concerning the Barry Seal smuggling organization's move from Louisiana to the Mena, AR Airport.
By the end of 1987, it was apparent that thousands of law enforcement man-hours and an enormous amount of evidence of drug smuggling, aiding and abetting drug smugglers, conspiracy, perjury, money laundering and illegal modifications to smuggling aircraft had gone to waste. Not only were no indictments ever returned on any of the individuals under investigation for their role in the Mena Operation, there was a complete breakdown in the judicial system. The United States Attorney, Western Judicial District of Arkansas, assured us that there were no national security or other issues involved which would impede investigation and prosecution of criminal violations in Arkansas, however, be refused to issue subpoenas for critical witnesses, interfered in the investigations apparently mislead grand juries about evidence and availability of witnesses, refused to allow investigators to present evidence to the grand jury, and in general made a mockery of the entire investigative and judicial process. The Subcommittee on Crime, through media reports, became aware of public concern over lack of indictments and requested my testimony.
As you are aware from our testimony and statements made to your investigators by Hayden Gregory, Chief Counsel for the Subcommittee on Crime, if I had followed the directives of [deleted] and [deleted], I would have completely mislead the Subcommittee about the problems which we encountered in the investigations, and ultimately would have perjured myself in connection with an allegation about a bribe from Barry Seal to a high ranking Department of Justice official. The intense IRS Disclosure Litigation process which we described was purely and simply designed to impede the Congress of the United States in their investigation of issues which impact on the very heart of our judicial system, and ultimately the security of this country.
Why did this happen? What could have been important enough for the Department of Justice and the Department of Treasury to join hands in an effort which resulted in such interference? Perhaps there are answers. Evidence gathered during the last year and a half indicates that during the period 1984 through 1986, the Mena, AR Airport was an important hub/waypoint for transshipment of drugs, weapons and Central American "Contra" and Panamanian Defense Force personnel who were receiving covert training in a variety of specialties in the Nella Community, located ten miles north of the Mena, AR Airport. The evidence details a bizarre mixture of drug smuggling, gun running, money laundering and covert operations by Barry Seal, his associates, and both employees and contract operatives of the United States Intelligence Services. The testimony reveals a scheme whereby massive amounts of cocaine were smuggled into the State of Arkansas, and profits were partially used to fund covert operations. Two witnesses testified that one of the Western District of Arkansas Assistant U. S. Attorneys told them that the U. S. Attorney's Office received a call to shut down the investigations involving Seal and his associates.
Is this the reason why the IRS went to such great lengths to cause me to withhold information from Congress? I don't know. It is obvious that their interference had little to with 6103 or 6E information. There had to be another reason. Something so important, that it would cause IRS Attorney to deny even the meeting during which the subornation of the perjury occurred.
I have been asked to comment on the Treasury Inspector General's Office Investigation into this matter. After reviewing unredacted portions of the investigative report, I can tell you that it contains many inaccuracies and it should be the subject of intense review by this subcommittee. The conclusions exhibited in the report allow criminal violations to go unpunished, and provide fertile ground for similar violations in the future....
When this subcommittee formally requested my testimony, the pressures from [deleted], and my immediate supervisor [deleted] increased dramatically. [deleted] told me not to even call the Little Rock, AR District Office to inquire as to the location of case files concerning the Mena Investigations. I was not allowed to either inquire about the files or return to Little Rock in time to review the
files for information relating to my contacts with the Disclosure Litigation Attorneys....
It is ironic that the Internal Revenue Service promotes use of polygraph examinations in conduct of criminal investigations of American taxpayers because they, along with most other investigative and intelligence agencies, know that polygraph is an excellent investigative tool for determination of the truthfulness of witnesses. Paul Whitmore and I volunteered for, and submitted to, polygraph examinations administered by the United States Secret Service, because we were eager, as we told Commissioner Goldberg, to prove the truthfulness of our testimony. I again challenge [names deleted] and any other Internal Revenue Service personnel who dispute our testimony, to take a polygraph so that the truth can be displayed and this matter put finally to rest.
Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, it is unlikely that any of the IRS executives and attorneys who were involved in this matter will ever take polygraph examinations, and they will probably never admit to their deception. They know full well that they do not have to submit to polygraph, and that they have protection within their powerful circle of co-conspirators who have distorted the truth so many times on behalf of this organization that they now comfortably perceive the truth to be whatever the Internal Revenue Service tells them it is. Loyalty is an important and valued asset. But never, ever, should loyalty be justification for perjury. History is filled with tragedies resulting from deception and crimes in the name of loyalty, patriotism and national security. It seems that most of America keeps their hands over their eyes, even when it comes to evidence of U.S. Government involvement in drug smuggling and IRS corruption that erodes voluntary taxpayer compliance, and ultimately, the very fiscal foundation of this country. With the exception of a few in depth articles by publications such as the Boston Phoenix, even the media has refused to demand answers. Please do not allow this matter to remain unresolved.
The personal cost? The loss of an unblemished federal law enforcement career and my retirement; emotional and financial trauma beyond description; my portrayal by IRS Management as someone who turned their back on their organization, in other words, a traitor; inability to obtain other federal law enforcement employment because of perceptions that I am a "whistleblower" and because the Internal Revenue Service withheld my closing evaluation for over eighteen months....
I am thankful for the Attorney General of the State of Arkansas who viewed my refusal to perjure myself as a quality which he wanted in his administration. Otherwise, I might still be unable to find employment as a criminal investigator. Unfortunately, reprisal against me for truthful testimony and cooperation with congress continues. The U. S. Attorney in Western, Arkansas has sent word on two occasions that his office will not handle any Medicaid Fraud cases for the State of Arkansas as long as I am on staff with the Medicaid Fraud Division. In other words, he is willing to allow Medicaid Fraud, which affects healthcare of the poor and elderly, to go unchecked in the entire western half of the State of Arkansas, in order to sabotage my first fulltime employment in nineteen months. His actions have caused us to have to take all of our criminal cases to the Eastern Judicial District U. S. Attorney, placing an unfair workload on both he and his staff.
How is it that IRS and Department of Justice Attorneys continue this type of action with no perception of risk. Why are we powerless to stop it? The Attorney General of the United States should directly intervene with [deleted] to stop retaliation against me. Mr. Goldberg should take charge and begin to deal with integrity problems at the top of his organization. He should also, very quickly arrive at a solution in order to fully restore my Federal Law Enforcement career, with full benefits and compensation for the effects of IRS corruption on me and my family. He should gladly provide Mr. Whitmore and his family full compensation for any losses which they have incurred, and allow him to effectively continue to progress in his management career. People who cooperate with truthful testimony should be promoted, not demoted. We have fulfilled our responsibilities to the Internal Revenue Service and Congress under extreme duress. If the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Attorney General refuse to fulfill the responsibilities of their jobs, they should be replaced with someone who will.
What can be done to protect IRS Whistleblowers? The first thing you can do it make sure that whistleblowers are given the guidance and emotional support which they are going to need to get through some very tough times. We were totally unprepared for the emotional trauma of dealing with an enemy which we really didn't understand. How many IRS Employees know that IRS Attorneys are not there to protect them individually, but are there to protect the IRS Organization? There is no Attorney-Client relationship between an employee and an IRS Disclosure Litigation Attorney. The employee will not even be able to obtain the briefing records prepared by the attorney. Yet I was told repeatedly that I had to use the assigned Disclosure Litigation Attorney, that I had no choice.
Finally, you can insure, that complaints about retaliation are promptly addressed, and that action is taken to intercede, and provide immediate relief to the extent possible. People are not going to willingly expose themselves and their families to economic and emotional peril, without some assurance that there will be real support from Congress
During a portion of the past three years I found myself filled with feelings of rage, disgust and helplessness as I discovered that I was powerless to deal with managers within IRS who perceived me as a troublemaker, and even a traitor, because I insisted on telling the truth. I believe that I exhibited the ultimate in loyalty to the Internal Revenue Service. I did not begin dealing with anyone outside my organization until I felt that I had exhausted all avenues within the organization. I sought guidance from each of my supervisors, who, until I became involved with this subcommittee, did nothing but encourage me to go back and go through the same horrifying process again. I feel now that I have done all that I can do. I despise the corruption that I have witnessed firsthand, but I have had to displace my anger toward the people who participated in it. I am in the process of trying to reconstruct some semblance of life and security for my family. It is my sincere hope that others within the Internal Revenue Service will read the transcripts of the hearings conducted by this subcommittee and learn from them.
Mr. BARNARD: As we begin our interrogation of these two gentlemen, I want to thank both of you for coming to the subcommittee to tell your story. I think that your testimony in the past has helped us mold an IRS of the future that will certainly not tolerate situations like the ones that you have experienced, and hopefully ill prevent any retaliation against whistleblowers in the future. Mr. Duncan, if IRS had given you more latitude in your Justice Department testimony in 1988, would you still be an IRS employee today?
Mr. DUNCAN: I am certain that I would.
Mr. BARNARD: Why do you believe that?
Mr. DUNCAN: I thought I had the greatest job in the Internal Revenue
Service. I thoroughly enjoyed my work, and I enjoyed the coworkers.
Mr. BARNARD: Where do you think that your investigation would have led?
Mr. DUNCAN: Well at the time I testified before the Subcommittee on Crime, we had just touched the tip of the iceberg, in my opinion. Since then we have received additional testimony that there were a lot more things going on, there was a lot more money that was being laundered. All I wanted to do was to be able to respond truthfully and answer questions completely before the Subcommittee on Crime.
Mr. BARNARD: What has happened to that investigation since you left it?
Mr. DUNCAN: The IRS investigation? To my knowledge, it has been closed.
Mr. BARNARD: What about the Justice Department?
Mr. DUNCAN: The statutes of limitations have expired on the cases and, to my knowledge, nothing else will be done.
Mr. BARNARD: Mr. Duncan, do you believe that the information on the $350,000 bribe to a high-level Justice official was valid?
Mr. DUNCAN: That is not a determination for me to make. I can only communicate that the law enforcement officer who received that information told me on numerous occasions that the informant that provided the information had provided in the past nothing but good information.
Mr. BARNARD: Had he ever been tested, as far as a lie detector test is concerned?
Mr. DUNCAN: I am not aware of that.
Mr. BARNARD: Mr. Duncan, why do you believe that [deleted] and [deleted] requested that you not offer this information to the Justice Subcommittee?
Mr. DUNCAN: I have asked myself that question thousands of times. Based on the information we have received in the last year and a half it appears that things were going on at that airport that could have been related to the Contra resupply, I don't know. I perceive that they wanted to protect the Internal Revenue Service from anything controversial.
Mr. BARNARD: What has happened in that particular case since you left, to your knowledge?
Mr. DUNCAN: Information is still coming in, additional witnesses are testifying, and we are gathering information right now.
Mr. BARNARD: Are you associated with that case now as an investigator for the Arkansas attorney general?
Mr. DUNCAN: I receive information and pass it along to the attorney general, and also to Congressman Alexander.
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Date: Thu Sep 14, 1995 8:45 am CST
From: Duane Roberts
EMS: INTERNET / MCI ID: 376-5414
MBX: eaou669@aldebaran.oac.uci.edu
TO: * David Beiter / MCI ID: 635-1762
Subject: MENA — Another excerpt from a letter to Congressman Doug Barnard, Jr.
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CONTINUED INVESTIGATION OF SENIOR-LEVEL EMPLOYEE MISCONDUCT AND MISMANAGEMENT AT THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE:
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Hearing before the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, First Session, July 24, 1991
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Washington : U.S. G.P.O. : For sale by the U.S. G.P.O., Supt. of Docs., Congressional Sales Office, 1992.
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GOV DOC # Y 4.G 74/7:Em 7/16
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The following excerpt is from a letter written by IRS Representative N. Paul Whitmore to Representative Doug Barnard, Jr. (D-Georgia), former Chairman of the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee.
The letter was written in response to a question posed by Chairman Barnard as to why Mr. Whitmore felt that IRS attorneys wanted to suppress former IRS Special Agent William C. Duncan's testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime in 1988 regarding events taking place at the Intermountain Regional Airport in Mena, Arkansas.
From page 320.
2. It is my perspective that the IRS attorneys were not acting alone when they wanted to suppress Mr. Duncan's 1988 testimony. Although, they visualize themselves as the guardians of the IRS image, I do not believe that they would take it upon themselves to suggest that S/A Duncan to commit perjury. [deleted] stated that the Commissioner's Office was very concerned about Duncan's upcoming testimony. This was a direct indication that the Commissioner's office was involved. Carrying this a step further, it is my perspective that the Commissioner's office would not be involved unless pressure was received from an outside source.
It is my opinion they wanted to suppress his testimony as they did not want the IRS to be involved in a controversial issue. In addition they did not want the IRS to be identified as the agency responsible for uncovering evidence has shown to be a covert operation involving illegal arms shipments, illegal drug smuggling and illegal money laundering activities which involved other federal government agencies. If this were not the case, why then is the Commissioner's office still going to such great lengths to protect these attorneys.
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Date: Thu Sep 14, 1995 11:10 pm CST
From: Jamianne [Ms. Freddi ".A.R.." Reddi]
EMS: INTERNET / MCI ID: 376-5414
MBX: jamiv@verilink.com
TO: * David Beiter / MCI ID: 635-1762
Subject: Annotated Mena-Gate Bibliography 9/14/95 for your reading & viewing pleasure
> Mena-Gate/CIA-Gate Bibliography
700 Club Fact Sheet: "Mena Airport: Arkansas' Contra Connection?"
Bowers, Rodney, Arkansas Democrat-Gazette-August 26, 1995: "British TV Journalist Finished Filming Mena Airport Secrets" — "Reporter calls tale of drugs, arms for Contras ‘fascinating.'"
CBS News focused two segments of "Eye on America" on the Mena episodes.
Celerino Castillo and David Harmon: Powder Burns: Cocaine, Contras and the Drug War. Castillo was the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration’s (DEA) top agent in El Salvador during 1985-87
Cockburn, Alexander, The Nation, p 582.
A drug and gun trafficking operation through Mena in western Arkansas was protected by Federal officials. In a 1983 IRS drug smuggling and money laundering investigation by the Arkansas State Police, prime investigator Russell Welch, uncovered CIA connections, and was warned off by the FBI. Arkansas state agencies brokered loans to associated companies and interfered with investigations.
Dettmer, Jamie, "Arkansas Probe Leads Back To Mysterious Rural Airport" Insight Magazine, a Washington Time Corp. publication. August 28, 1995 issue. Editorial Offices (202) 636-8800, 76353.2113@compuserve.com Fax: (202) 529-2484.
The Nation, p 189-192. "How the Drug Czar Got Away", by Martin A. Lee.
The gist of the story is that the USA is more interested in implicating Nicaraguan Sandinistas in drug running than in prosecuting smugglers. Also the US Government funded contras with drug money. Jorge Luis Ochoa of Columbia was captured in Spain. The DEA (at least one agent was also member of Lieut. Col. Oliver North’s team) offered to have extradition bungled if Ochoa would implicate the Nicaraguan Sandinista government in cocaine trafficking. Ochoa refused. After 20 months, Spain decided that USA was seeking to use Ochoa as a political instrument and denied extradition to USA. Ochoa had fled to Spain in June 1984 after being implicated in the assassination of Lara Bonilla, the Columbian Minister of Justice who had crusaded against his country’s $5 billion per year cocaine trade. Alder Berriman Seal (Barry Seal) said he flew 1500 kilograms of cocaine from Columbia to Managua for Ochoa. The story quotes The Wall Street Journal as reporting that four imprisoned drug pilots who knew Seal said that Seal was part of contra supply network, delivering weapons and drugs. Seal also took secret photos of Sandinista soldiers loading cocaine on his C-123 transport (the same plane as shot down with Eugene Hasenfus). Ochoa contributed money to contras. Ramon Milian-Rodriguez told Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International Operations that he had funneled $10 million to the contras through former CIA operative Felix Rodriguez in 1983. James Kible, Madrid Spain based DEA agent assigned to Ochoa case and another DEA agent, Victor Oliveira were caught while boarding a plane for Switzerland at Madrid Barajos Airport with $5 million in cash, supposedly for North’s contra-aid team. The records of these arrests have been "disappeared."
Larry Nichols: "The Truth Will Set Us Free," For The People News Reporter, May 30, 1994, p. 13.
Oliver North: Under Fire
Penthouse: "Snowbound," July, 1989, written by investigative reporters John Cummings, and Ernest Volkman.
Penthouse: "The Crimes Of Mena," July 1995, by Sally Denton and Roger Morris (a "follow-up" article on "Snowbound")
[Both Penthouse articles are available in various Internet versions.]
Terry Reed and John Cummings, Compromised: Clinton, Bush, and the CIA, How the Presidency was Co-opted by the CIA, SPI Books, a Division of Shapolsky Publishers, New York city (1994, hardcover, $23.95, 556 pp). It can be ordered from Crown Books and other sources.
Terry Reed is a former Air Force Intelligence officer (with a top secret clearance and a distinguished record) who became an operative of the CIA and FBI during the CIA Iran-Contra operations in Mena, which airlifted guns to the South and drugs and cash on the return leg. Oliver North was recruited by and worked with Barry Seal. He was a firsthand witness to the guns, cocaine, money-laundering, and Contra training aspects of the operation.
When security began to unravel in AR because of leaks, mistakes, and inquisitiveness on the part of some of the media and some investigators, Clinton realized Terry had met too many people and learned too much about the guns, drugs, and money-laundering in AR. The CIA proposed that Terry head a front company in Mexico, where the guns-drugs smuggling operation was being moved. Clinton made it clear he wanted Terry to take the offer. The front company was supposed to be a cover for smuggling guns only. But Terry discovered his employees (CIA operatives) were secretly using his business to smuggle drugs on the return leg from south and Central American. He attempted to extricate himself and there resulted a break with the CIA and FBI. He found the FBI had fabricated a complete criminal file on him and his wife as drug smugglers, an aircraft thieves, as insurance against Terry’s possible disloyalty. Realizing elements in the government had turned against him, he went in to hiding —like Robert Redford in Days of the Condor. He was brought to trial. The prosecutor and possibly the judge was fully aware that he was innocent but that he was being persecuted for being a political persona non grata. He was acquitted, only to be smeared by Time magazine, under Strobe Talbot (see above).
He is currently suing Time. Send contributions to: Reed Counter Offensive, 3232 San Mateo N.E., Suite 155, Albuquerque NM 87110.
John Cummings co-authored the 1989 Penthouse article, Snowbound. — editor
Reed, Terry, The Mena Connection, video-documentary (140 min. VHS) You can order it for $19.95 at 1-800-888-9999 (24 hrs). — a "blockbuster" A poster to the Newsgroup: alt.current-events.clinton.whitewater says:
...Better than his book. I highly recommend that everyone here get it. It has a bunch of news footage from a Ft. Smith, AR TV station, from a major Chicago network TV station, and the CBS Eye on America report on the matter. There is also a very interesting recording in the tape of a phone conversation between Hubbell and a Time reporter. Terry’s wife Jan also give a great interview in the tape. And much more. There is a lot of video footage in this tape that I had not seen before, and I have been following this issue for two years, have read Terry Reed’s book, and been following this newsgroup since the day it began. After viewing the tape a few times and sharing it with family and close friends, you might also consider donating the video to your local cable access station.
Monika and William Stevenson: Kiss the Boys Good-bye. A poster to GS writes:
The book makes this clear: relations between Bush and Perot had gone downhill ever since the Vice President had asked Ross Perot how his POW/MIA investigations were going.
"Well, George, I go in looking for prisoners," said Perot, "but I spend all my time discovering the government has been moving drugs around the world and is involved in illegal arms deals...I can't get at the prisoners because of the corruption among our own covert people."
This ended Perot's official access to the highly classified files as a one-man presidential investigator. "I have been ordered to cease and desist," he had informed the families of missing men early in 1987.
R. Emmett Tyrrell Jr: "Furtive Drug Flights," article, Aug. 25, 1995, posted to alt.current-events.clinton.whitewater
R. Emmett Tyrrell Jr is Editor of the American Spectator.
Jack Terrell and Ron Martz: Disposable Patriot, ISBN 0915765381, National Press Books, 1992. "Highly recommended for background on the US intelligence community, drugs, and the Contras!"
U. S. News & World Report, Oct 3, 1988, p. 13. "Elaine Shannon in Desperados says that in June 1984, Oliver North, in an effort to expose alleged links between the Sandinistas and drug dealers, leaked information which exposed Barry Seal who was infiltrating The Medellin [cocaine] Cartel."
Wayne G. Walker, Ph.D., J.D.: "Do the ends justify the means (and the Menas)?" Published in the American Reporter, Weekend edition: September 9-11, August 30, 1995. Sent from NationTALK: Enhancing societal learning e-mail: walker @ rolnet.com website: http://www.rolnet.com/~wwalker/nt/nt.html First-class BBS: 805-948-4900
Wall Street Journal, [editorials, articles]:
— "BCCI Opening," Sept. 5, 1995, Review & Outlook, page A14.
— "Investigate Mena," 07/10/95, p. A12.
— "The Mena Cover-up," Oct/18/94.
— "On the Mena Trail," Epstein, Edward Jay.
— "Still a Strong Scent on the Mena Trail," by Bill Plante and Michael Singer, CBS News, Letters to the Editor, May 3, 1994, p. A15
— "Who is Dan Lasater?" 8/7/95, editorial page.
— "Secret Meetings in Arkansas," May 13, 1994, p.A11]
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Imagine how many layers of money laundering there are in Ukraine 🤯
Your work is outstanding Elizabeth!
Between you, Joe Lange at Badlands media, Political Moonshine, and SpookdBlog, the insights into this oppressive Criminal Enterprise is staggering. Each of you have areas of expertise that support each other's work on a massive scale.